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ll'l THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

~.lEit:EDITH

P.AGE,

l~laintiff,

Appellant and
Respondent on Cross Appeal,
vs.

HO~IE FIR~~
CO~IP r\NY, a Utah

LTTAH

INSURANCE

Case No.
9903

corporation,
Defendant~ Respondent and
Cross Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STr-\..TE3IENT OF THE NATURE OF THE
CASE
This is an action by which plaintiff seeks to recover
the actual cash value of a fourplex building totally
destroyed by fire on or about the 11th day of February,
1961 under two fire insurance policies issued by the
defendant.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury and submitted on two
special interrogatories. The lower court originally rendered judgment for the defendant. Thereupon the lower
court granted plaintiff a new trial pursuant to plaintiff's
motion for new trial. Upon defendant's motion to reconsider the court's order granting a new trial, the lower
court in a memorandum decision granted a partial new
trial pertaining to the second insurance contract and
vacated the original order granting a new trial. From
the judgment for the defendant, plaintiff appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and a new
trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Meredith Page, the plaintiff, has been engaged
in the business of rental properties as well as an insurance agent for Utah Home Fire Insurance Company,
defendant, for a period of approximately thirty years.
He worked through Heber J. Grant and Company,
the general agent for defendant corporation. (R 104105). On or about the 31st day of December, 1958,
plaintiff purchased a surplus air force officers' quarters
loc~ted at._ the Salt ·L{lke Air Base from LaVell 'Vebster, 'a professional moving man. (R 108). Said build-
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was a fourplex consisting of 2~ rooms, excluding
closets and bathrooms (R 116) and of about 4,670
square feet. (Exhibits 3 and 4). Thereupon plaintiff
went to the office of the general agent, Heber J. Grant
and Cmnpany, for the purpose of obtaining fire insurance on the building. (R 108). He talked to a certain
Ove C. linkley, Secretary-Treasurer of Heber J. Grant
aud Cmnpany, office manager and assistant manager
of the general agent, (R 108, 281) and explained that
he was going to move the building some 20 odd miles
out to 14610 South State (across the street from the
State Prison), fix it up as a rental unit of four apartInents. He explained generally the condition of the
building. (R 108-110). After a discussion as to the
muount of insurance to place on the building, plaintiff
applied for $20,000.00 with the statement that after
he did smne more work on it he would take more insurance. (R 108-110).
111g·

l\Ir. lnkley had serious doubts as to whether insurance could be written and said he would have to refer
it to the underwriter for approval. (R 292-294). Thereupon a policy for $20,000.00 with extended coverage
was issued to plaintiff. (Exhibit 1-P).
Sometime in the Spring of 1959 the building was
n1oved and placed on a foundation at 14610 South State.
The building was closed in by replacing all broken
windows, new doors where needed, locks replaced and
installed, cuts in the building caused when moved were
covered and some dan1aged walls were repaired, addi-
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tional width of eaves were being constructed, the building was painted and arrangements made with a plumber
to connect the plumbing to the sewer and prospective
tenants were interviewed. (R 117-120).
On June 27, 1960, pursuant to a telephone call from
plaintiff to Heber J. Grant and Company, another
policy in the sum of $10,000.00 with extended coverage
was issued to plaintiff. (Exhibit P-2) (R 110).
Prior to the issuance of the second policy, defendant paid a fire claim under the first policy to fire damage
to an out building which burned. Defendant had sent
an adjuster out to the property to adjust the claim.
(R 110-112).
During the period in which the building was being
prepared for rental, the plaintiff had permitted a certain
George Welshman without compensation to store certain items in the building such as a small light power
plant without fuel tank or carburetor; saws, hand tools
and carpenter tools used in construction of the building;
a pillow slip; Christmas tree stand; a bundle of aluminum; a couple of car generators; a washing machine;
kitchen table; dining room table; and some iron scraps.
( R 266-271) . The said items were not in the area of the
source of the fire. ( R 266) .
On or about the lith day of February, 1961, said
fourplex was totally destroyed by fire.
Suit was filed to recover under the two insurance
1
policies after failure of satisfactory adjustment. De6
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feudaut answered generally by denial and set up an
a tl'irtnati,,e defense that cmnpany was not liable because
of increased hazard because of materials stored in the
building and non-occupancy. (R 1-11).
DiseoYery procedure was used and demand for jury
trial was filed by plaintiff. (R 12-15). A pretrial was
held on the 6th day of ~'larch, 1962 and pretrial order
1nade and issues framed as to the amount payable under
pol1eies and whether or not the premises had been used
in Yiolation of policies. Jury trial was set for April 25,
1962. (R 16).
On the 23rd day of lVIarch, 1962, defendant filed
a n1otion for leave to amend pretrial order by adding the
additional defense that policies were issued by fraudulent representations of overvaluation of the building
and 1..1se for which the building was to be used. ( R 1718).

On the 30th day of March, 1962, over plaintiff's
objections the pretrial order was amended to apparently
coYEr defendant's requested issue of over valuation of
the property. (R 19).
Again at the opening of the trial the defendant
again sought to enlarge the issues of the trial now to
include n1isrepresentations as to the condition of the
building at the time the insurance was written. This
enlargen1ent was again vigorously objected to by plaintiff. (R 93-96).
Each party had three agents testify as to actual
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cash value of the buliding at the time of the fire as
follows:
Ronald Sylvestor,
for plaintiff
$38,430.00
John W. New,
for plaintiff
$33,718.39
Sam F. Soter,
$27,804.24
for plaintiff
Alex Gray,
$24,780.16
for defendant
Raymond S. Fletcher,
for defendant
$ 7,500.00
Guy D. Alder,
for defendant
$ 7,500.00

(R 188-193)
(R 202-222)
(R 222-230)
(R 274-283)
(R 308-334)
(R 335-343)

ARGUMENT
Point 1. THE ISSUE OF FRAUD SHOULD
NOT HAVE BECOME AN ISSUE OR A MATTER OF DEFENSE.
Fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the
plaintiff was not a proper issue to be tried or submitted
to the jury for the following reasons:
1. The defense was not pleaded, nor included in

any pretrial order and not timely raised.
2. The defendant waived any defense and was

. estopped from raising said defense.
3~

The issue served to confuse the jury, prejudice
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the jury and detracted the jury frmn concentrating on the only true issue of what was the
actual cash value of building at the time of trial.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and modern
court decisions ha ,.e stressed the need for fairness and
complete discoYcry in the preparation and trial of cases
so as to eliminate surprise and offer counsel an opportunity to prepare his case to meet framed issues. The
including of a defense of fraudulent misrepresentation
as to the condition of the fourplex at the beginning of
the trial violated the rule of fairness, was a surprise and
provided no means of preparation concerning the issue.
Rule 8 (c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
provides "In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party
shall set forth affinnatively ... fraud ... and any other
111atter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." The defendant's claim that plaintiff made fraudulent misrepresentations of material facts in the procuring of subject insurance policies has never been
pleaded even after the conclusion of trial and at this
stage of the proceedings. See also Rees v. Archibald~
6U (:.?d) :264, 311 P2d 788, where the Utah Supreme
Court held that an affirmative defense must be pleaded
and proved.
The defendant did not ratse the issue even when
he asked the court leave to amend the pretrial order. See
defendant's motion (R 17) wherein he claimed a misrepresentation as to the purpose and use of buildings
and the valuation of said building. The amended pre-
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trial order is a1nbiguous but apparently follows the
same theory. During the trial the defendant offered no
evidence to rebut plaintiff's testimony and evidence
that the intended use of the building was for rental
purposes. As to the over valuation issue, defense counsel at beginning of the trial said, "I don't think the
over valuation is particularly an issue in the case, Your
Honor. The policy provides that the company will pay
the actual cash value and that is the third issue in this
case as I have set them out or it is one of the issues."
(R 96). The defendant thereby abandoned the defense
he asked to have inserted in the amended pretrial order
and confirmed the position of plaintiff recited in the
amended pretrial order.
Mr. Appleman in 20 A, Appleman on Insurance
Laws and Practice, 11978, concerning Subject ~latter
of Insurance-Misrepresentations, says:
"The burden is upon the insurer, relying upon
a defense of misrepresentation or breach of warranty, to plead and prove such defense. The
same result follows where the insurer defends
upon concealment of material matters or fraud
in the procurement of the policy. It has thus been
stated that the insurer must prove the representations made, their falsity, materiality, and reliance thereon by the insurer, plus in some cases,
the fact that they were knowingly made by the
insured with the intent to deceive."
In reference to the waiver of the defense of fraud
and estoppel, this writer will briefly refer the court to
the record concerning certain undisputed facts testified
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to by defendant's own witnesses. See R 284 as to the
fact that I-Ieber J. Grant and Company is a general
agent for defendant cmnpany. See the cross examination of 1\'Ir. Inkley, the Secretary-Treasurer of Heber
.T. (irant and Company (R 291-296) wherein he admits
muong other things, that plaintiff came into the office
and adYised him that he had purchased a surplus building at the Air Base and that he was going to move it,
place it on a foundation and there were four large apartInents and that he referred the matter to the underwriter.
He said in part as follows: "There was still some question in my mind as to whether the underwriter ought
not pass on it. It was out of the ordinary, a building
being moved and set up again on new property and I
thought he should know these things before he O.K.'d
the order." (R 294). See also the cross examination of
Norman Everett, the fire insurance underwriter of
Heber J. Grant and Company, as follows: (R 306).
Q. \Vere you advised that this building was go-

ing to be moved from the air base out to about
20 miles out to Draper?

A. No.
Q. If you had been advised of that what would
you have done?
A. \Ve would not have accepted the risk.
Q. Let me put it this way, if you were advised

that it was to be moved only, what information do you people have to have before you
leave the office and go out and investigate
something that has to be insured, don't you
investigate things that, are questionable?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. All right now, if you were advised that this
building was vacant and sitting out on the
air base for an apartment building and was
to be moved out some 20 miles out to the Point
of the Mountain and placed on a foundation,
your testimony is that you would have rejected it at that instant?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In other words, if you were given that much
information, you then were put on notice that
this may be a bad risk?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did Mr. Inkley make any recommendations
to you or do you recall?
A. No, I don't recall for sure on that about any
recommendations.
Q. As a matter of fact, if you were given any
information at all that a building was to be
moved from one location to another, what
would your reaction be?
A. Not to accept it.
Q. Just with that information alone?
A. Yes, sir.
'Vith the above facts in 1nind, this writer now
quotes at length from 16 Appleman_, 9103-General
Agent or officer:
"Following the definition of general agent
previously adopted as one haYing power to issue
a poliGy. for the insurer or to bind the insurer by
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his contract, it is the accepted rule that knowledge acquired by such agents within the scope
of their duties is the knowledge of the insurer.
It has been otherwise stated that the knowledge
of an officer or agent of the insurer, which is
acquired within the scope of his duties of employment or agency as to facts material to the insurance, is imputed to the insurer, in the absence of
collusion between the insured and the agent. And
this is true regardless of whether such information is communicated to the insurer."
"An insurance company is charged with the
knowledge of a general agent issuing a policy
relatiYe to the insurable condition of the properly
insured. . . . "
"Knowledge on the part of a general agent of
facts rendering the policy voidable, or of a breach
authorizing a forfeiture, is imputed to the company, for the purpose of effecting a waiver or
an estoppel to rely upon such forfeiture."
"Notice acquired by a departmental manager
of the insurer's general agents regarding facts
within the scope of his authority is imputable
to the corporate insurer, though the manager was
unauthorized to alter or waive any policy pro·
cessed."
Many cases are cited in support. This writer also
quotes ~Ir. Couch at 7 Couch on Insurance 2d 35:252,
Constructive Knowledge:
"'Vhile knowledge of the true facts is essential
to the existence of a waiver or a breach of a policy
provision or the falsity of a statement of the
insured, it is not necessary that the insurer had
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actual knowledge. It is sufficient if the circuinstances are such that the insurer should have
known the actual facts because it had knowledge
of such matters as would have put a reasonable
man on inquiry, that is, that it had had constructive knowledae. Thus knowledge which is sufficient to lead ~a prudent person to inquire about
the matter, when it could have been ascertained
conveniently constitutes notice of whatever the
inquiry would have disclosed and will be regarded
as knowledge of the facts, and the insurer may
not deliberately disregard the circumstances
which put it on notice."
And also 7 Couch on Insurance 2d 35:271:
"'Vhere the insurer had knowledge of such
facts as should have put it on inquiry and such
inquiry would have disclosed the true facts, it is
estopped to assert the falsity of the insured,
statements when the latter were made in good
faith."
In substance, even if defendant had properly raised
the defense of fraud or misrepresentation, said defendant as a matter of law has waived its claimed
defense or is estopped from making it an issue. The
only conflict in testimony is between the two officers
for the general agent as to what transpired between
them. Over this the plaintiff had no control. As a matter
of fact, the only testimony opposing Mr. Page's testimony as to the condition of the building as recited in
R 108-110 is the testimony of Mr. Inkley and Mr.
Inkley's testimony is founded on bad memory.

~n. of this testi~on~ based on r:p~nd repeat14
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eel hypothetical questions served only to confuse the
jury and detract it frorn the main issue involved as to
the actual case value of the fourplex at the time of the
fire.
Point 2. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IX
IXSTRlTCTIOXS GI\TEN TO THE JlTRY.
The plaintiff respectfully asserts that the trial court
erred in its instructions to the jury in the following
specific rna tters :
I.

Instruction lla, defining actual cash ntlue, is
erroneous and the trial court should have given
plaintiff's requested instruction No. 2, which is
the correct definition.

2. The trial court should have instructed the jury
as to a general verdict as set forth in plaintiff's
requested instruction No. 1 rather than by two
interrogatories.
3. The trial court erred in the giving of the second

interrogatory.
The definition of "actual cash value", as it applies
to fire insurance policies, has not ever been decided by
the Ctah Supreme Court to the knowledge of this
writer and is therefore one to be decided. There is by
no means any uniformity of definition in other jurisdictions. Some courts have adopted the definition as
set forth in plaintiff's requested instruction No. 2 as
follows:
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"Actual cash value of the property at the time of
the loss means the replacement cost of the building less
items specifically excluded from coverage such as underground pipes and foundation under the ground, less
depreciation for wear and tear."
Some courts have defined actual cash value as being
synonymous with "market value" and have adopted a
broad evidence rule permitting all evidence to be admitted in arriving at this definition.
The trial court did neither in its definition of actual
value in instruction No. lla. The instruction did not
define what actual cash value meant, but substituted
the broad evidence rule as a definition. The instruction
as given gave no guidance to the jury as demonstrated
by the jury returning to the court asking what was
meant by actual cash value. (R 354).
61 ALR 2d 725 et seq. sets forth an excellent dis-

cussion of the cases involving actual cash value of buildings. See also 6 Appleman 3823.
Plaintiff urges the adoption of the rule set forth
by our sister State of Idaho as to the definition of actual
cash value as it pertains to buildings. See Boise Asln.
of Credit Men v. U.S. Fire Insurance Company_, 256
Pac. 523. On page 527 the court says:
"The actual cash value of the property at the
time of loss is not ordinarii v the same as the cost
~f rep.lacing the ~roperty ~vith new property of
hke k1nd or quality. As to a building, it is the
cost of a new building of the same rna terial and
dimensions of the one destroyed, less the amount
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the destroyed building had deteriorated by use
-4 Cooley, Briefs on Insurance, p. 3082. On
the other hand, the market value of a building
cannot be used as a test in determining the
amount of recovery for the destruction of a
building for Yarious reasons. If there was no
market value for the property, so it could not
be sold, it would not have any value, and consequently there would be no loss . . . . Again the
tnarket value of some buildings (as for instance
tenetnent houses) may be much greater than
their actual cash value .... 4 Cooley, Briefs on
Insurance, p. 3981; 'Vall v. Platt, 169 Mass.
398; 48 N .E. 270; 3 Sutherland on Damages
(4th Ed.) pp. 3042, 3043."
'Vhat is used as definition for actual cash value can
have a wide range of effects as to the compensation paid
to the insured. An example of this is the variance of
appraisals in this case. John New, one of plaintiff's
experts, used replacement cost new, less depreciation
for wear and tear, less items such as foundation and
the like and arrived at an actual cash value at time of
fire of $33,718.39. For depreciation he used the same
depreciation tables as used in the insurance industry,
to wit: Marshall \raluation Service. (Exhibit 14-P).
On the other hand two of defendant's witnesses, Raymond S. Fletcher and Guy D. Alder, used market value
basis and arrived at $7,500.00. The latter two appraisers' figures amounted to about $1.60 a square
foot, which is hardly enough to compensate for a chicken
coop. Under cross examination both Fletcher and Alder
admitted they would place a different figure if the
building had been located at Midvale or say Salt Lake
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City. They also admitted that if there were two houses
side by side, of equal cost and square footage, they
would arrive at different figures if the room arrangements were different. (R 330-331, 342).
The definition of actual cash value should be one
that can be understood and one that justly and adequately compensates the insured for his loss.
The trial court should have submitted the entire
case to the jury rather than by two special interrogatives so that plaintiff would have full benefit of demanded trial by jury. The case was not complicated
requiring interrogatories and would have not required
the court to make certain findings itself, which is contrary to the basic principles of a jury trial.
The second special interrogatory submitted to the
jury concerning failure to make a full and honest disclosure to defendant insurance company is vague, ambiguous and made without definition and not worded
to ecompass facts argued by defendant. The interrogatory submitted was as follows:
"Did plaintiff Meredith Page knowingly fail to
make a full and honest disclosure to defendant Fire
Insurance Company of the material facts regarding the
nature and intended use of the burned fourplex?"
To which policy is the court directing the jury's
attention, the first policy issued when the fourplex was
at the air base, or the second policy concerning disclosures made at the time the building was situated at
the location where it was at the time of the fire?
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The status of the building at these differeut ti1nes
when the two policies were issued were entirely different.
The special interrogatory appears to direct the jury's
attention to whether or not a full and honest disclosure
was tnade to defendant fire insurance company of the
material facts regarding the underlying nature and
intended use of the burned fourplex. The record clearly
discloses there was no conflict of evidence that the nature
and intended use of the fourplex was for rental purposes. The special interrogatory did not ask of the jury
any questions relative to a finding of fraud concerning
scienter, reliance by defendant, and whether or not defendant was damaged by failure of plaintiff to make
a full disclosure.
Point 3. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ITS JUDGMENT.
The trial court clearly invaded the province of the
jury by making its own findings of fact, contrary to the
evidence, by forming an issue that was not properly
before the court, to wit: fraud, and by rendering a
judgment adverse to plaintiff.
The trial court properly granted a new trial in the
first instance and then erred by granting a partial new
trial.
CONCLUSION
This has been a case where the defendant has had
a field day shot gunning the plaintiff with one defense
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after another up to and including the trial with the
purpose of confusing the only real and true issue of
the case-what was the actual cash value of the burned
fourplex at the time of the fire? An issue of fraud has
found its way into the trial after repeated objections
by the plaintiff. The evidence even refutes that it is a
good defense even if it were properly presented, in that
defendant insurance company waived its defense and is
estopped from raising it. The trial cou_rt erred in its
instructions, confused the jury and then after discharging the jury began to make its own findings of fact
and invaded the province of the jury. The trial court
properly acted when it initially granted plaintiff a new
trial. Both parties now have an excellent deposition and
it makes good sense and is fair and just to send the
matter back to be retried in its entirety. The new trial
should, however, be on only one issue and that is actual
cash value at the time of loss with a definition that is clear
of meaning and will render just and adequate compensation to the insured.
Respectfully submitted,
DAHL AND SAGERS
17 East Center Street
Midvale, Utah
Everett E. Dahl
Victor G. Sagers
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Appellant, and Cross
Respondent
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